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 One should hear the calling of two hyperbolic selfs within this questioning 
concerning what I would propose to call here the desire for panop-tech-clair-voyance: 
Selfless interpreted as an infinite reactivity (machinery) 
Selfless interpreted as an infinite responsibility (agency) 
 Reaction or response is what, according to Derrida, always classically 
partitions the human (agency) off from the entirety of the non-human an-agential (i.e. 
whether animal or machine). Within this opositional coupling, of the reaction or 
response, the presumed cleanliness of a humanistic responsibility forms the self-
sealing benchmark or organising pivot par excellence. Reaction then would form the 
height of irresponsibility.  
 Outside of this partitioned history of such a safe ahistorical truth comes the 
imminent arrival, as we will soon see futurologically  demonstrated, of certain 
‘invasive’ prostheses that will promise or threaten the return of the human to the 
status of that animal or machinic an-agency just mentioned. This threat or this 
promise comes along however within a train that forms a component part of but a 
whole history of prior invasive woundings to the anthropo-centralised ego. Such 
wounds to the agency-of-the-human have come, according to a recent historical re-cap 
by Harawayi, within the numeric shape of four comparatively modern wounds to this 
once presumed safe base of the absolute human-whole: the Copernican, the 
Darwinian, the Freudian and finally the Cyborgian. Somewhat fittingly however for 
such post-humanistic prostheses, attachments or (machinic) extensions, there seems to 
be within this final fourth wounding a notable lack of proprietorial nomenclature, or 
of an anchoring proper name. This residence of the [C]yborgian wound lacks 
capitalisation. Can we perhaps question this lack and in return supply (or buy into) the 
potent common currency of a founding biographical signature to act as metonymic 
signage? 
 In answer to this quest, we would offer here for our, as we will see panop-
tech-clair-voyant, purposes the figure of a galvanian wound, named after the Italian 
18th Century physician and physicist Luigi Galvani. As discover of the bioelectric 
properties of these “animal” and “human” nerve and nervous systemsii, a whole 
subsequent arché or paleo-prosthetic pan-electrical truth system was unlocked within 
the very heart of the human envelope and thus was borniii the possibility and potential 
to interface and “interfere” (for how can one now be seen to invade or “interfere” 
with what was previously always already charged with such a currency-of-the-
electrical?) with “the human” via apparatuses that could lead, we might worry, toward 
the nameless monstrous bridge-being of a Frankenstein-esque composited-
recognitioniv. More than such de-monstrositiesv however, the galvanic wound opens or 
offers the inside up to the outside and allows for a veritable folding-out into the 
arbitrating open; an invagination or an electrical archiving of what might in fact lie 
(and we obviously measure this word carefully) beneath. The skin of the being-that-
we-are is now no longer something that folds or better holds the inside, but which 
now conveys, through the trans-portalvi ontology of this wound, a connection or an 
availability. The galvanic skin responds and thus (now only) reacts? Response or 
reaction?  
 Does then this fourth ‘bio-electrical wound’ or dehiscent ontological opening 
of the selfspace onto the otherspace offer any directional cues to a location (for this 
bridged human-animal) of either a space of response or of reaction? And further does 
this galvanian wound, while forcing upon us the recognition of this ontologised 
history of an always already existing electrical interior, also involve an attendant 
concern or hope (depending on one’s point of view) of an additional turning toward a 
further techno-scientific or pragmatolgocial plunging into either Über-responsibility 
or Unter-reactivity? In other words does this recognition of the primacy of the bio-
electrical interior offer either a promising or threatening furtherance of responsibility 
or reactivity respectively? Response or reaction? 
 
1. Selfless Responses or Selfless Reactions?  
 So, to rewind and remind ourselves of the doubling of the latter part of our 
opening titles, we are working here within the dual undecidable orbit of two futurally 
directed ends or solicitations of the semantic resources (or recourses) of this singular 
syntagmatic questioning concerning “immediation”.  Some concrete images of these 
somewhat split ends: The first end is of the eschatological end, or of a quite worrying 
interpretation; where we worry that we ourselves and all of these others, will lose our 
“selfs” and become just so many reactive machines, zoo animals or beehive dwellersvii 
(the death of the infinity of the Levinasian autrui?viii). The second end is the more 
promising teleological promise of a self and an other driven or encouraged into 
selflessnessix by the affordances granted by the opening-up structures of the network; 
by being hooked-up to the sociality-of-the-social and thus to be brought or 
encouraged out of the protective, somewhat selfish shell. Selfless then or self-lessx, 
this self is thought at this moment (as still existing before the encroachment of these 
futurially positioned ‘ends’) to be a singular separable “self”. A human whole-hearted 
or ill-hearted self: but a hearted Cartesian self nonetheless.  
 Something then is imminently coming along (we place our ear upon the tracks 
and some well-attuned ears can hear the approach) to steal this Cartesian ‘self’ awayxi. 
The purpose of this paper, it must be made clear, is to cast or to sew some doubt 
around a supposedly pre-existent, pre-im-mediatised ‘selfness’ that would pre-exist 
such an imminent approach of immanence and some doubts also around the 
subsequent modelling of a choice either of some hyperbolic surplus of responsibility 
in the face of this newly arrived inside-of-the-outside or a hyperbolicxii deficit-
restrictiveness of reactivity (again in the face of an new arrival of the inside-of-the-
outside)  that a certain form of projected tele-techno-pathic engagement would seem 
to presuppose as delivering. The purpose of this paper then is not one fuelled by 
models of fear or of hope, but of a model of the human based upon the problematic of 
the reactivity of the human beforexiii such machinery. Before we reach these questions 
concerning pre-panoptechclairvoyant reactivity we will concentrate here on a few 
exemplars who would wish to expand our humanistic horizons by plugging us into an 
expansive post-human space. 
 
1.2 Posthuman Interfaces and Inter-Face-iality 
 Who or what parties could we call upon, as currently representing the promise 
of this currently encroaching post-humous self-lessness (of which at the moment we 
are self-ed but soon to loose)? In searching we would, of course, have no shortage of 
futurological exemplars to stand-in-for many more of those who would, as a totality, 
see us as soon being able to raise and place ourselves squarely outside of this all-too-
finite temporo-spatial condition; a new post or trans condition exterior to the confines 
of a self-hitherto-trappedness. These exemplars then are commonly labelled and self-
labelled as the post-humanists and the trans-humanists. We will very briefly look 
toward three posthuman resources or exponents from the transhumanist field before 
settling upon our main cyborgianxiv example. 
 Representing a potent dose hyperbolic responsibility there is John Perry 
Barlow. Projecting and protecting the a-domain of cyberspace Barlow and his 
somewhat kooky border-busting text “A Declaration of the Independence of 
Cyberspace”xv forms a strong polemical opposition to those who would like to re-
impose (national, etc.) restrictions on Internet communicativity; Barlow would here 
like to clearly re-echo some valuable founding-foundational sentiments that have been 
lost within the modern age of ‘restrictions’. For as electronically-freed techno-enabled 
Thoreauan tele-hunters, he believes that we should be able to hunt and comport 
ourselves out the within the cyberspatial open and boundless without any terrestrially 
‘positioned’ laws picking us up on any conventionally territorial Locardian exchange-
values; localised-legal “values” that might tightly establish our footprints or 
movementsxvi. Cyberspace is a frontier and a properly lawless, open-source 
pathbreaking that transcends and should transcend these pre-cyberspatial terrestrial 
localist restrictions. In connection to such supposed de-territorialised disembodied 
space/s, we have investigated elsewhere a somewhat illustrative aporetic example of a 
so-called tele-presence that problematises or unfurls some of the strange logic of this 
wish for a transcending of territorial regimes through the possibility of the actual 
hunting of animals placed within distant counties and killed via an internet 
connection. Questions of undecidablity -but not the indeterminacy- of the status of the 
deathplace and inter-spatiality were concentrated upon therexvii. Similarly Barlow’s 
Cyberspace would wish not to touch down on any territory or its regimes or practices, 
even though it cannot help but touch down upon the very territories it nevertheless 
wishes to escape and evade being captured within. Needless to say, Barlow’s is an 
argument with and assault upon territor-reality that powerfully deconstructs its own 
premises and groundsxviii. 
 Then there is Ray Kurzweill the technological futurist and sometime inventor 
of some very concrete and very helpful ontical technological prostheses. To go along 
with this solid track-record of certain useful groundfloor concrete-ontico-practices, he 
has written two books full of predictions of future Moore’s law fuelled apparatuses; 
mostly centring upon predictions of the future-fact of being able to download our 
psyches into permanently-existing “mechanismsxix” and thus dispose ourselves of our 
aforementioned Platonico-Cartesian shells (as just so much innocent and now 
unnecessary baggage). In a sort of technological version of Fukuyama’sxx ‘end of 
history’ argument (itself presented upon the fall of another form of divisive curtain) 
there is the powerful image of an ultimate synthesis or singularity that is near and that 
will end the longheld and somewhat problematically ‘finite’ (as his findings are 
findingxxi) sticking-point of this body and its tendency toward decrepitude and of final 
closure. He is taking his food-supplements until soon, and luckily within his own 
lifetime, he and we can finally live forever: Peter[pan]occhio? 
 Relatedly, and closing in upon our main post-humous quarry, or case study, 
there is George Dvorsky. Dvorsky, while ultimately sharing Kurzweill’s 
transhumanist predilection for and prediction of ultimate immortality, sees a more 
short-term achievable goal of an imminently-to-hand (that is, soon to be integrated 
into a networked everyday ‘ready-to-hand’) invention of what he neologistically calls 
techlepathyxxii. He points out how recently Chuck Jorgensenxxiii, a scientist based at 
NASA, has invented a technology to implant reading-writing (input-output) 
prosthetic technologies upstream from previously damaged or non-functioning vocal 
apparatuses of some disabled subjects, by hacking or tapping-into nerve signals 
situated within the throat that control speech. These nerve signals, Jorgensen found, 
operated in normal subjects whether or not they actually enacted the process of 
moving their lips. Thus he hacked into a region situated upstream from the lips, in a 
region situated notionally closerxxiv to the location of the human organism’s intending-
to-say; at some point spatially “earlier” then than this localised ontical sticking or 
“saying-point” that is broken in these particular subjects. As so often is the case, these 
injured subjects function as test cases, or pragmatically driven thought-experiments, 
for something much more radical and socially-encompassing (an upping-of-the-ante). 
For while the power of speech is then given-back or bestowed upon those once 
relatively closed or struck-dumb, this lucky or local repair job can form the basis of 
some more trans-formational or trans-humanist success or proof-work. As a result 
then of these borrowings-of or burrowings-into these previously purelyxxv naturo-bio-
physiological signals, he points to the presence of a close-by somewhat unintended-
transportation or resource to help furnish the onward teleological journey (and as we 
will see, one set within an entelechialxxvi family-circle) to the long-sought location that 
is telepathy.  
 It strikes him, in hearing about this space agency invention, that by the process 
of moving the prosthetic connection up a littlexxvii, up this anthropo-biological entity’s 
communicative-process chain, that we might totally cut out and expand these voco-
centric (I will not of course say phonocentricxxviii) apparatuses out and be able to 
communicate our very intending or meaning-to-say, without going to the (deferredxxix) 
trouble of actually having to say it. Speech and what it does will still be there, but will 
now (or at least ‘soon’) be so much clearer and cleaner. Such a will-to-cleanliness 
and the washing out of what might muddy communication haunts as well our main 
exemplarxxx, who we will now move along to.  
 
2. Kevin Warwick and the Feeling of the Feeling of the 
Inside of the Significant Other 
 Professor Kevin Warwick works within the apparently very practicalxxxi 
environment of the University of Reading Cybernetics lab. Something of a media 
darling a few years ago (especially on a number of titillating “future-shock”-“future-
sex” shows), Warwick has invented a series of subcutaneous or embedded prostheses 
to enable communication between, for example, 1) one’s own proper-body and the 
buildings which one owns (or perhaps work atxxxii) and which are thus one’s extended 
property; and 2) the ability to control technologies that operate across internet 
connectivity (with attendant benefits to medicine and of help in augmenting or 
creating various other tele-extensible ‘expertises’ unable “themselves” to travel) and 
finally, at least for our main purposes here, 3) an embedded batteriless chip that 
enables both himself (he loves being his own guinea-pigxxxiii) and his wife to share the 
(co-)presence or evidence of their internal “love chemicals” as evidence of their 
intimate pleasure within one another’s presence, without as a consequence having to 
worry about any previous uncertainties of any, perhaps, questionable vouchsafes-of-
voice or of any fog-of-the-face (that this technology seeks to bridge and obviate). 
Warwick is intent on upgrading himself and his wife Irena to avoid such difficulties. 
 For Warwick has invented himself as “the world’s very first cyborg” and 
believes in the future of highly integrated technologies that will expand our sensual 
milieus or our interpersonal umwelt and that these will help to form the very future of 
our post-humanity. Older forms of communication via speech and facial gesture will 
soon be on the wane. In his autobiography (or his auto-cyborg-ography?) Warwick 
states that our children’s children will “look back with wonder at how their ancestors 
could have been so primitive as to communicate by means of silly little noises called 
speech” (my emphasis). In a television interviewxxxiv that reported on a related 
implanting of chips into both his wife and his own nervous systems (and pre-faced 
with a section title reading “linking the brain with technology in order to upgrade the 
human species”), Warwick states: 
 “That was for me the most exciting thing scientifically thing that I’ve been 
 involved with. She had electrodes pushed into her nervous system, and with 
 my implant-electrodes in my nervous system, electrically [intonation in 
 original] we linked our nervous systems together. So what happened, 
 when she moved her hand ‘chuke-chuke-chuke”, my brain received three 
 pulses “chuke-chuke-chuke”. So we communicated telegraphically, nervous 
 system to nervous system, for  the first time in the world. Quite clearly now 
 communicating brain-to-brain is the next step” 
 Such replacements of external speech and of external sight by the replacement 
or upgrade of a more direct technological ‘thought transfer’ (what we are proposing to 
call here panop-tech-clair-voyance) will finally transport us to the long awaited 
promised land or location of the behind-the-face-of-the-face-of-the-other and allow as 
such for a direct and immediate form of communication that will finally be able to 
edit or to splice out any uncertainty or undecidability from our intimate relationships. 
For Warwick then, no longer will there be any speech act or any other act of the body 
to be worried over, concerned by or questioned (nor presumably, by extension, will 
the promissory of the once necessary, though still perhaps perturbing, performative of 
the “I do” of the wedding ceremony any longer need to signature-stamp the opening 
of a marriage?) but will allow us to really share our real spirit and feeling with our 
significantly immediatised other (a shared space or an overlapped hearth of ipseity). 
For the faces and the voices that will once have projected our significant others ‘out’ 
to us will no longer form a possible undecidable barrier-entrance to what presumably 
lies beneath, but will provide a final cure for such uncertainty of these two sites of 
mediation of, for example, the pre-immediatised voice and the face: intimate as they 
are, these two communication devices also intimate a certain uncertainty principle or 
the possibility of a loss of meaning. Hence the need for a device to inter-face with and 
open up the previously hidden potential of the galvanian fourth wounding. 
  
 For these latter “natural gifts” (of the face and of the voice) that one certainly 
presently greets (through our aistheses that enable a quite immediately-felt 
interpretation) with great pleasure and which one certainly loves-of-the-other and 
which give one so much food-for-desire-and-thought (gifts that allow the human 
subject to be-with-the-other, or of the Heideggerian significant otherly oriented mit-
da-sein) always immanently include an element, or at least the possibility of a risk of 
a deviation from the path-of-the-proper. Through the presence now of such prosthetic 
grafts, the family-plot of the couple can now truly thicken and blend into a unified 
onexxxv. Who can argue that these secondary prostheses, though coming late upon the 
scene, are not then so much more primary than what they come along later to so 
secondarily augment? For surely the desires embedded within our seeking of the very 
behind-of speech and of the other-side-of the face; such “behinds” for-the-sake-of-
which we seek out our intercourse in the first place (the seeking for the catching of its 
sight/site). Intercourse always already assumed then a distance of mediation that is, 
quite paradoxically, not the intercourse itself. Envois (Derrida) then are sent out 
through such intercourse, but the demanded closure of the destination is not touched 
enough (in its joint-core) so a second-order envois or envoy is always already pre-
supposed by the failure of the primary internally-fissured envois to properly deliver 
its message and have it finally arrive. 
 Something, in excess, then cannot quite find itself being touchedxxxvi within 
such activities of intercoursexxxvii, even as-one is speaking, looking or touching upon 
the matter of the other. What is sought-out within the operations of the sense organs is 
the envois (message) that apparently might lay, or perhaps “lie”, behind the inter-
coursal-touching and is then much more intimately at stake within the circulations of 
the game than the surface of the loved one that one makes contact with. Mediation (or 
intercourse) itself then, in this somewhat pre-Levinasian totalising model, is nothing 
but the embodied desire to erase itself as (de-)distancing (as a “materiality” that 
comes between).  
 The desire then is to bridge and once bridged, the mediatory device (for this is 
now what we are calling these various ontical intercourses, in “sympathy” with this 
totalising model) disappears to become immediate: the ultimate teleology of speech or 
sexual intercoursexxxviii here would reduce writing, as excess, from itself (as 
undecidability, improbability; difference) and of course as differancexxxix.  
 Thus, as with Dvorsky and his speech-thought based techlepathy, Warwick 
would now techlepathically connect and interface with his own wife’s very 
organismicxl, as well as orgasmic, interiority and to be (rather than previously, 
perhaps, not enough to be) his wife’s own intimate ipseic pleasure; a pleasure that he 
himself has gifted or given to her and most certainly and symmetrically vice-versa 
(more than simply a mise-en-abyme mirroring?). The previously dominant inter-
personal, inter-spatial or inter-facial economy as excess-beyond-total-exchange 
vanishes within a lossless and vastly reduced economy and a sort of joint 
interpersonal Umweltxli arises in its previously divided wake. Obviously we are 
questioningxlii concerning this “techlepathy” or of what I would prefer to label here 
(to distance us from Dvorsky’s unproblematically inclusive term but also to bring out 
a Derridean overtone of “the envoi”) a panop-tech-clair-voyance.  
 
3. Certain Philosophical Questions Concerning the Problem 
of Thought-Transference:  Hegel & Tele-Familiarity 
 A so-called pre-panoptechnological clair-voyance involves the reduction of 
the fog or the spatial interruption that is the distance of the aesthetic apparatus of sight 
from its interestxliii on a grand scale. This clear-vision (as the word translates) or 
augmented second-sightxliv at a distance, as well as forming the dream-life of many a 
historically concrete couple, has also been the concern of some prominent thinkersxlv. 
Just as for Freudxlvi (as Derrida points out in his “Telepathy”xlvii, where Freud played-
with and leaned-toward telepathy as possibly existing inter-personal cashable 
currency of soul-exchange), so Hegel wrote some words on this subject for his own 
audience (also deliveredxlviii  in the situated lecture format) in talking a little about his 
own particular example and “use” of clair-voyance.  
 He was not however, as his English translator Wallace is at pains to point out, 
exactly sold on clair-voyancexlix, but this lack of being-sold-on-it was not so much the 
result of a doubt as to its veracity (i.e. as something that actually can happen), but on 
its proper place within a communicative system that places a pure (human) spirit 
pyramidically at the top and thus somewhat above its base level of intercourse. 
“Clairvoyance” is primitive but it nevertheless does exist. So base though it may be, it 
still nevertheless has a function to provide, if only as a powerfully figural illustration, 
within the circle of spiritual family values. Such an activity (of the figure of) clair-
voyance can certainly travel well, if only to be tamed through figuration and 
transformed into the actuality of spirit. It is in this former figural aspect of its 
presence, at the very least, that it has a rather uplifted and upright existence. 
 It exists as something that, within the grand Hegelian tradition, is to be lifted-
up (the famously powerfully teleological Aufhebung) into the human spiritual realm: a 
realm that, most importantly, centres around the inviolable solidity of a filial-familial 
unity. In the particular passage of the lecture where Hegel talks of clairvoyance and 
the family unit together, we find echoes that closely approximate those of the 
aforementioned Freudian excursions into the family+telepathyl coupling. But there 
will soon be a problem that will inherently and intricately haunt these functioning 
figurations, these telepathic family ties. We will have to wait a little to see these 
problems bubble on their surface.  
 Both of these excursions (Freud and Hegel’s) bind-to or feed-from the solidity 
of a blood-based family unit. For blood circulates through the channels of these 
distantly placed paleo or arché-prostheses and bring out within these channels of 
discourse only what is most proper, and thus already together, all together. The figure 
of blood contains difficulties however, as we just alluded. Hegel himself states as 
much (and backed-up as we will see by certain conceptual clarifications of his English 
translator) in his ‘Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit’. He states within the universal 
first-person that: 
“The family tie constitutes my actuality. There can be people who,  when in 
the external situation some change occurs, know about this in their own 
inwardness, their genius. So we have now to consider what exists in the form of 
presentiments. A man of forceful, sound self-feeling is bound to the usual 
condition of knowing. -But there are several examples in which, removed at a 
distance, a subject suffered a loss, nevertheless experienced an immediate 
sensation of that loss, believing that he had heard the noise or some such thing”  
                                      (Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit, p130) 
 
“Clairvoyants also know about distant objects. The individual is actual, and to 
his actuality belongs everything that concerns him. Since clairvoyants know 
their actuality, and their actuality is this concentration of feeling, -they know all 
of this in an immediate way…” 
 
(208 W. reads: so they know of this without the mediation through which one 
otherwise knows of such objects existing outside oneself. They know in an 
immediate way).  
 
“This is particularly true of blood friends…”  
(209 W. Adds: the same blood. Family is an ethical, but also a natural unity. 
Actuality of the one is substantially included in the substantial actuality of the 
other).  
“The sphere of actuality also extends to persons that interest one, belong to 
one’s environmentli, but extends further to such objects as belong to one’s 
circle and of which one can therefore know in one’s emotional life […]. Here 
belongs the phenomenon of ‘second sight’ of the Scottish […] Also the prophet 
Muller of Heidelberg can be mentioned […]. The occasion of his capability is 
noteworthy. At the death of his father he threw himself on top of his father, 
and with the most inner fervour prayed to God. The father was awakened, and 
this highest effort, this positing of the soul outside of itself, had fixed this 
predominantly emotional life in him.” (Hegel, ibid. p136) 
 The figure of the composited “blood-friend”. Thus distance and mediation are 
short-circuited in such clair-voyance by an immediation where blood flows within 
one large body composed of two geometrically distinct coordinates; a clair-voyant 
sang-clair that flows over and penetrates the barriers of skin. It is only through this 
blood that such communication can (ethically) flow. And yet simultaneously the 
blood must also simultaneously be composed of the social (hence the “blood friend”) 
which W. reads as composing of the “ethical  and natural family”: one’s spouse that 
one has a bond of spirit with binds itself here by the placing of an immense, though 
hidden, weight upon the word “ethical” while placing a more open weight upon the 
(seemingly less contestable) word family. Thus there is a naturalistic blood-bond that 
ties an ethics of the one to the other, without any “real” blood being present. All the 
burden is placed upon this somewhat structurally uneasy bridge-term then of the 
“blood friend”. But what cannot be questioned, even apart from this questionable real-
distance, is that blood is blood. What of this blood that flows through what is not in 
fact in itself composed of blood? 
 
Back to the Future: Panop-tech-clair-voyance 
 We come back to something, a spectral metaphor composed of blood, that is 
fuelling our present exemplar (Warwick) and his embedded chip enabled tech-
clairvoyance. In such a tech-clair-voyance we would not be dealing with a secondary 
‘invasive’ prosthesis (that would invade the prior-primacy of the a priori natural 
body-proper) but of a prosthesis that completes the call-of-blood. This call-of-blood 
will complete a lack that apparently, as with Dvorsky, always needed to be 
completed. The love-envoi sent out from the “blood-friend” (a rather inherently-
aporetic appellation as we have just seen) receives something already close-by and 
already interior. It just completes it more, or signs what was there already.   
 From a position where it was previously unable (through sensory-deprivation) 
to see inside we come to see the actually experienced position of the blood friend that 
so concerns Warwick and his pre-inventionlii. A pre-invention in a long-long-long line 
commun-ication inventions. Again it is a long story whose recounting would seem to 
be coming to a present-day close: Warwick sees himself as carrying out the work and 
the challenges that would place him in filiation with the tele-technological 
communication apparatus of Alexander Graham Bellliii  (he would indeed like to be 
remembered as an inventor of similar life-changing, geo-space-bridging prestige).  
 This is not however akin to tying two yoghurt cartons together with a piece of 
string in order to colloquy more immediately with our blood-friend loved ones, but 
more an super-intimate soliloquy of the (behind-the)face-to-face(behind). This would 
be something altogether more than a de-distancing electric speechliv, but of a sort of 
panoptechlairvoyant electric immediacy. This bypassing of the previous externality of 
the face takes each of us/them inside them-us in a sort of intra-circuitous technico-
blood-grouping. But of the distance brought shorter, to disappearing..? Is there 
nothing more to say? Questions that we opened with of selfless otherness? Surely to 
connect so snugly to the other, we must already be at home most cannily within 
ourselves? And if we are soon to be together with each other, there must have been a 
privacy that can later be made to join within a new properly compoundedlv blood-
privacy? 
 If the history of mediation or communication has always also been a history of 
the desire for the bridging and the bringing closer of previously distant distances 
(according to McLuhan, Ong, Levinson’s ‘Digital McLuhan’, the 
systems/cyberneticists, etc.) and of vanquishing missing or errant excesses that might 
otherwise fall to the tomb (and whose seeds might not be deposited within the 
knowledge-bank) we have two questions perhaps to problematise it. One is the 
Levinasian ethical question concerning totality, another is the more “permanent” or 
ineradicable (and less ethically inclined) Derridean/Bataillian problem of a general 
economy and differance.  
 For economy of time we will move onto the second question concerning 
panop-tech-clair-en-voyance, the disappearance of difference. For unlike Levinas’s 
respect for the alterity of the autrui (and of the face as something that stops and starts 
our having-of-the-other), the possible bypassing of the facial does not for all that 
implode these alter-spatialities. For the self here is not, prior to this possibility of a 
solid-bridging, in control and possession of its owness, to then be able to take-control 
or totalise (and not leave to excess or infinity) that which comes before this spatial 
coming before (the other). 
 Is the self a self before it comes to wish to hold itself out to the other? Is the 
self a monad looking for something outside, itself? Does the self need to build a 
prosthetic bridge toward the other, or is the prosthetic of the bridge-outside already 
inside? For Derrida we are perhaps always already telepathic and thus always already 
invaginationally wounded: 
 The truth, what I always have difficulty getting used to: that 
 nontelepathy is possible. Always difficult to imagine that one can think 
 something to oneself, deep down inside, without being surprised by the 
 other, without the other being immediately informed, as easily as if he or she 
 had a giant screen inside. (Derrida, Telepathy) 
 And yet, we still seek to supplement this arché-telepathy, but perhaps the 
better to hide or bury ourselves away from this prior techclairvoyant substratum that 
we have always already so thoroughly been composed of? Remember the galvanian 
wound of the arche-electrical. Prostheses of prosfetishes do not hide away a lack but 
offer the threat or the promise of an extension to hide the existent alreadyness of a 
prior extension beneath the apparent prior lack of this invasiveness. Just as for Leroi-
Gourhan the hand is not in any way invaded by the prosthetic tool but already 
available for it and calling-out for it in its very shape and ability to grasp or clasp onto 
what is outside, so the body (as galvanic already, but more as vibrating with 
invagination) is a quite uncanny abode: not of itself but of what is thought to be 
prosthetically outside.  
 In a twist on Haraway’s desire to have responsibility given to (to 
Christianise?) the animal -after Derrida’s question of animal possibilities of response- 
we might ask: and say the human reacted and has only ever reacted? What if the 
responsibility of the individual was only ever the panop-tech-clair-voyant machinic 
reaction of the other, of an alterity, inside? A reaction machinery unable ever to stand 
or have stood on its own two feet in any responsible way? 
 “[T]hen comes the last stage, the one that is still before us, but that I see 
seeing us coming and that softwarily, will have anticipated us right from the 
start. In this way a life is totally transformed, converted, paralysed by 
telepathy would await us, given over to its networks and its schemes across the 
whole surface of its body, in all its angles, tangled up in the web of histories 
and times without the least resistance on our part”  (p243)  
 Such threats, offered within the voice of the somewhat camp quotation above, 
offer a return to a poverty of world, but where for all that were the riches? What 
would be a resistance where, in truth (?) a solidity ground has always already been 
lacking? 
 For here we spot a contradiction or a strange aporetic cut within Haraway’s 
somewhat celebratory cyborgian fourth wound and one that Luigi Galvani already 
helped to have us recognise as dehiscent or open. Galvani’s electrical-technical 
interior does not seek to open a chasm, an abyss, or a wound between the animal and 
the human but to wound the safe biblical distance of a safe anthropocentric division (a 
division of which both Heidegger and Uexküll also partake of). In rightly seeking to 
question this rather neat divide however, why give responsibility unto to the animal 
and thus share out something of the human “individual’s” presumed possibility of 
answer from the bottom of an owned-responsibility? And so, without wishing to re-
establish the dividing line between the human and the animal, we might ask the 
question: “and say the human reacted?” 
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  As we will see towards the end of this study, Haraway is quite far away from 
occupying a univocal position vis-à-vis the status of the animal and her use of 
Derrida, as a friend at her pan-biologistic mess table, is equally far from being 
safely or univocally demonstrated. The cyborgian wound and the somewhat pan-
spatial position of the animal that she believes that Derrida helps to open up, by 
asking the question of the status of an individual agential response on the part of 
an-animal (here a cat, an empirical cat, in front of him in his bathroom one fine 
day): the question that Derrida asks in asking “and say the animal responded?” 
does not however stop dead in just one direction (of a reaction-becoming-
response) but can be seen also to move the question equally in the opposite 
direction. We can ask (and later we will) whether response is such a safe-
extensible category? Derrida rarely stretches one category to cover ‘the other’, so 
we hope to close our conversation with a question concerning the reaction and its 
undecidable stretch over the domain of the safe response. We might worry, 
further, about the status of a relatively simple ‘pan’ stretching of the category 
responsibility as a curative to a dualist conception that places or parcels the 
animal as reactive-human-opposite and which then ties up all of the ends (the 
ends that we have here opened with) or whether the conceptual category of this 
response/reaction opposition would be sufficiently problematised by stetching 
either end of this duality to cover or obviate the other. While we will certainly, at 
the close of this argument, be problematising Haraway’s stretching and inclusive 
opening-up of the category of responsibility (an opening up that would include 
the animal as a companion or ‘fraternal’ ‘friend’) by provisionally coming in the 
opposite direction with a human given covering of reaction, we hope to unsettle 
or shake this conceptual framework in a much more undecidable direction without 
obvious end.  
ii This fourth wound then is not a singular but a double-wound, for in being both 
bio-electrical and common to human and animal, two once safe borders become 
invaginated in a form that problematises two supposed temporalities.  
iii Now this birth, this recognition, was the birth of a recognition in all senses. This 
final wound to the enveloping pride, like these previously recognised wounds, is 
not some explosive prosthetic invention that comes invasively along from some 
errant technological exterior coordinate, but is a discovery of something always 
already interior. This wound then is not an invention that offers a practical 
distance from previously more observational discoveries (Copernican, Darwinian 
Freudian) of a prior-existing nature, but is itself an injurious recognition of 
something always already prosthetic. As far back as ‘back’, the electrical interior 
that Galvani helped us to recognise was already doing its firing and its sparking, 
even as those ignorant yet noble cave men were trying to spark up and ignite 
their first primal fires and then later pre-scientifically mythologising the arrival of 
these gifts. Later still our somewhat naïve ancestors may worry about a certain 
illicit trade or of the stealing of something improper to our prior nature; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
something dangerously additional but nevertheless safely distanced by the 
placement of a coordinate that is external. We now recognize that one can be 
supplemented by too much of what we already have; a supplementation of 
something dangerously internal. The very harm that this electricity can do is not 
because it invades something that was altogether empty of it, but instead comes 
about through the overloading of a circuitry that can only take so much extra 
current, currency or charge. “Whenever” the dividing line occurred that struck 
man down, or built man up from a previously reactive “animality” (and like the 
sparked-fire, later mythologised as either supplied or stolen away), this electrical 
interior, this charge that finally always drains away from us, finds all life living 
under its temporary protection (hence the wound to our animal separation 
anxiety). But this is a double-edged recognition that offers something futurial just 
as it takes away something we thought to be altogether posterior: new images of 
capture and storage electrical circuitry are offered in substitution or replacement 
for a prior blood-replacement mythology (for we are thinking obviously of 
vampires as escapees of the imprisoning of the double-edged settings of the sun) 
with an electrical systems-theory that simply interfaces with just a suchlike 
supplemental expansion of its already-own.  
iv Again, to recognise this monstrous-monster, after this wounding that we now 
uncannily cognize and have since then come to “know” via the enlightened 
investigations of Luigi Galvani, it is not then the mere supplemental “lately”-
invasion of some errant extra-monstrosity, but of a monstrous-city already 
internal to our previous “nature”. Obeying here then the integral rulings of 
Kristevian abjection, the symbolic vomiting out of this integral integrated 
imag(in)ery is nothing but the somewhat difficult (to say the least) recognition of 
an image already really inside as real-ity. A strange logic of the pictor-real is 
residing in in-alien-able-residence here. Something ensconced safely inside does 
not come to imagine the horrors of something purely outside, but is thoroughly 
(and already) invested with its invaginating electrical-code. There is nothing 
really worryingly foreign to code-break-into, and here the horror itself resides. 
The firewall is nothing but a very (nothing but) porous myelin sheathing that 
itself conducts the charge. 
v We would see here a double-facing de-monstrosity that monstrates and de-
monstrates somewhat simultaneously: Frankenstein’s unnamed monster’s 
monstrous presence is allowed or brought-about by the art/ifice of being able to   
composite or piece together, through a supposedly secondary late-coming 
electrical charge, what was already charged in its prior intimate-interiority (of 
what each of the pieces were already composed). This late arriving “secondary” 
electricity however interrupts a proper circuitry of circulation that was put into 
motion via a proper birth from a proper-womb. The secondary-womb that adds a 
secondary-charge, and which runs across or monstrously sutures (what should 
be) the gaps of dead pieces, adds a false-life or a second life that can never 
outrun or live up to the live truth of the primary. This secondarity should clearly 
be placed into the flames. A primary primacy however finds itself haunted or 
seconded through a Derridean logic-of-the-supplement which cannot help but see 
(though the flame would hope to bury this unease) the illicit writing work of this 
electricity as already present and charging the very intimate-interiority of what is 
now not most proper. This fire all to easily burns their very own fingers. 
vi According to Jakobson there are three forms of translation from one notional 
position into another. While two of these are notionally linguistic (intra-linguistic, 
for example in rewording for better understanding while inter-linguistic occurs 
between two language systems notionally foreign to one another), a third sense 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of ‘translation’ has to do with the translation between one semiotic system and 
another. One such semiotic system is the language of the galvanic skin response. 
Once discovered or recognised as a form of communication then instruments can 
be invented for the reading of such ‘utterances’: another system (for example a 
speech-based linguistic one) is necessary to read these traces or movements. 
Just as Freud reads hysteria as but a series of symptoms of something beside 
itself, in itself, we have the presentation of a new interiority not previously 
available to be read (reading forms the nexus-instrument of such possibilities of 
systemic exchange) or fathomed. A prior secrecy is uncovered where previously it 
was secreted away, entombed or encrypted. While hardly uncovering a secret in-
secrecy, the engine runs to burrow deeper toward that notional core and 
translate it into a public language or discourse. Science and the tradition of 
unconcealment was always Freud’s avowed goal (and, interestingly, why the 
figure of telepathy forms such a spectral figure in his ‘Dreams and Occultism’ 
lecture: does it exist, in which case we have a discovery of science, or does it 
not, in which case psychoanalysis will discover other reasons for the symptom-of-
telepathy). This ambivalence concerning telepathy in relation to psychoanalysis’ 
status as a science, but of a science open to the other is interestingly explored 
(especially in terms of Derrida’s playful uncovering of these psychoanalytic 
remainders) by Royle in an essay titled ‘The Remains of Psychoanalysis: 
Telepathy’. Here he points to the unassimilable figuration that telepathy assails, 
or wounds, the Freudian wound with. Translation and trans-portation within the 
panop-tech-clair-voyant desire-systems that we will shortly be looking at take the 
figure of telepathy as a prosthetic goal that is not in need of a prior natural-
telepathy. Here we would have a prosthetic supplementation of a sort of sixth 
sense whose empirical existence or empiric extension is, of course, highly 
uncertain. Here we would perhaps then be techno-scientifically supplementing or 
prosthetising a myth or indeed a ghostly naked lack (a prosfetish?). Within this 
latter science there is not the worry of status of discovery that so haunted Freud 
but the invention of a prosthetic system that would induce the presence of what 
previously was perhaps merely the domain of certain occultish desire. Such an 
occult would be the engine of this regional output of an ontic technoscience. 
vii This is the strange celebratory-deploring apocalyptic image that Josh Harris, 
the 90’s Internet entrepreneur, likened the future of humanity to. As objects of 
the zoo (or of the zoographic gaze) he believes that we will super-lose our 
privacy and that we will, in the future, very much “live in public”. As proof of this 
prediction he created two famous New York public/private happenings that rolled 
Big Brother into some predictive, pre-dative facebook experiments. In his first 
social experiment “We Live in Public” he created a closed-in beehive styled pod 
(or coffin?) hotel where all members would be able to look at each other and 
interact with each other 24/7 for an extended period of time (until it was 
shutdown by the police around a month in). Every pod was networked together 
via cable-cctv and from time-to-time members were taken out and interrogated 
by Stasi-imitating overseers who would work to reduce further inhabitants’ sense 
of self. In an interview to introduce his conceptual-concept-artifice he stated 
“Everything is free here, except the videotape. That we own” to underline the dis-
ownership of personal space that each inhabitant would be giving up or 
exchanging for this regulated freedom of consumption and movement. The 
selfless image of the worker-bee again raises its powerful metaphoric (lack of) 
visage, just as it so powerfully does also, as Derrida points out, as a pivotal 
image within Heidegger’s zoo-graphic chamber in ‘Basic Problems in 
Phenomenology’. Equally in Uexküll’s influential essay ‘A Walk Through The 
Worlds of Animals and Men’ (not least for Heidegger, who wrote at some 
considerable appreciative length in this ‘Problems’ book about the then current 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
umwelt researches of Uexküll) talks about the poverty of animals in comparison 
to man’s richness of world and particularly of the trapped tick that reacts 
mechanically to the butyric acid secreted by a passing cow. This trapped poverty 
is the umwelt that we must understand that surrounds the animal as of a soap 
bubble (Uexküll provides some impressively communicative examples that hides, 
while not trapping, an impressive conceptual complexity). In truth, he points out, 
we occupy umwelts too, but our umwelt is a very open and shapeable bubble. 
Such restrictive imagery of the bee and the beehive that encompasses and would 
threaten the rich human relation to ‘the open’ is also memorably (and in 
predictive eschatological intones) captured by E.M. Forster in his short story ‘The 
Machine Stops’ where people no longer travel or embark on journeys into the 
open, but stay in their pods and see, but not touch, everything (including their 
intimate geo-distant relatives) from a distance. Nobody, apart of course from the 
few, see within this machine, which will eventually stop, anything really to worry 
agitate or campaign about (for of course actual travel makes you dirty in all 
senses) as nobody here realizes their entrapped poverty of being (and how 
mechinic-beelike they have become). Unsurprisingly some see this as an early 
C20 short story based on a future vision of some captivating zoographic web 2.0 
Internet-machinery. The pieces however were already in place and captured by 
quite a number of stories and inventions (though, of course, like the ancient 
Greek steam engine they had yet to find their epistemic local prowess) such as 
the Victorian Internet or the age of tele-technologies such as the telegraph, 
telephone and pneumatic tubes (later visualised so cleverly in Gilliam’s ‘Brazil’). 
Further into the dark land of the human-insect there is the image of the crowd 
where the individual-responsibility of the face disappears. Here we find the ‘The 
Day of the Locust’, where a swarm of insectuous quasi-telepathic mood-
enraptured de-individuals mechanically play-out a reaction programmed in by 
some event that overruns them. A pre-crowdal responsibility thus hemorrhages 
out from holdings the body-proper and thus gets itself lost within the faceless 
dimensions of the labyrinthine cityscape. An interesting anthology titled ‘Crowds’ 
(edited by Jeffrey Schnapp) explores many such images of the crowd (and its 
cityscape).  
viii For we will ask later whether the desire for penetration that operates through 
the desireful imagined machines that we will see as exemplifying the panop-tech-
clair-voyant “alter-spatial-gaze” do not wish to cut out the undecidablity of the 
face itself and all it stands for. What we would here call inter-faciality (echoing 
both Levinas and the traditional idea of the techne of prosthetic interfacing) 
would not wish to cut out or deface the undecidable site of the face itself. For 
‘The Face’ is what presents the interior to the exterior and which not only offers a 
means of clear access or denial through certain non-verbal cues (forming a 
notionally simultaneous visible-invisible curtain), but also the haunting possibility 
of secret and secretion (entombing a truth denied to a particular outside that 
would desire access) that might fail to betray a notional intentionality. The face is 
both friend and enemy to the notional interlocutor and so as an ‘inter’ or between 
site, there is always the risk as well as the reward. As site of preference, or of 
clear reference, the clear and present reward of the truth (in all of its desired pre-
facial nakedness) and of the possibility of the secret of a secretion is what 
interlocution is after (but would also wish to come before, in all senses). The 
bypassing of the possibly blocked road of the face, through interfacing with the 
bio-electrical galvanic apparatus, would assure and, as we said, cut out the 
necessity of the troubling facial intercourse. This possibility of a matrix of the 
extra-facial, as we will see later, is what umbilically feeds and keeps going our 
main panop-tech-clair-voyant exemplar Prof. Kevin Warwick’s quest. The face 
would thus be lifted out of the picture and panop-tech-clair-voyant apparatuses 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
brought down as of an ultra-clear-penetrative-visor; clearing out the thickety 
problematic-of-the-undecidable that any inter-facial intercourse (and other 
supposedly intercourses lacking immediacy by extension) would maintain. On this 
view (for we are certainly not forwarding this simultaneous pessimistic-optimistic 
position as our own, but for more complex reasons, that we hope will later 
become more clear or even clair) responsibility would, in such a bypassing of the 
undecidablity of the face, be replaced by a beautifully and purely reactive 
machinic cybernetic loop. Nothing would, any longer, fall toward the tomb-of-
uncertainty through such an impenetrably thick fogging of the face. Reaction not 
responsibility. 
ix So many social networking ideals exhibit images of empowered ‘smart mobs’ 
(for here we are not dealing with ‘the crowd’) who come together to see their 
interests through before dispersing to other interests. On this view, as tea party 
activists they network together, not with the aim of losing their identity in some 
mass, crowd or hive, but of temporarily or temperately coming together so that 
the imposition of a framework does not win. Within this particular and progressive 
portrait of selflessness, the situated self joins likeminded selfs to help out a cause 
that is heartfelt. As evidence of this temporariness of their self’s security, they 
would point out the sheer overlap of group identities within their facebook pages. 
They are not, on this view, zoologically confined to a bubble, but self-less in a 
very self-full way. Networking makes contacts and stretches the self’s bubble: the 
riches of the unwelt increase and here again we find some powerful post-human 
imagery at play, or on the prowl? 
x Animal reaction is a self-less poverty-of-world in opposition to the human’s 
world-forming vision. While coming from a lecture course of , this is also almost a 
straight quotation of Jacob Von Uexküll’s. Further evidence of Uexküll’s influence 
upon a 1920s German strain of phenomenologically inclined (or more properly 
here Neo-Kantian in this case) philosophy at the time comes in the shape of Ernst 
Cassirer who headed the University of Hamburg where Uexküll set up his Institute 
for Umweltforschung and who probably also introduced Heidegger to his work 
(Heidegger attended a lecture of Cassirer’s at Davos where Uexküll’s current 
umwelt researches formed part of the subject matter). Cassirer writing in his 
‘Essay on Man’ stated, “There is an unmistakable difference between the organic 
reactions and human responses” (p.29, my emphasis). Again we have reaction 
and response and an abyssal space coming between them. Cassirer adds an extra 
symbolic layer for the human, which comes or intervenes between the Merknetze 
(receptor net) and the Werknetze (effector net) that the animal also possesses. 
Man is not just set apart as the animal rationale, but according to Cassirer also 
animal symbolicum. The animal is denied the symbol. Similarly, Merleau-Ponty 
(‘Nature’) in appreciably addressing Uexküll’s non-mechanistic approach to the 
animal, however likens certain categories of animal to what he calls ‘animal 
machines’ or non-institutional (as in lacking in the locality of a certain portion of 
plasticity or ‘choice’) ‘reflex republics’ where organs rule the organism instead of 
vice versa. While allowing for more variegation he erects a machinic comparison 
that sets the human at a summit of an a-machinic positionality. Merleau-Ponty 
does however simultaneously open up a space of temporal-based reactivity within 
more ‘complex’ bio-entities in his interpretation of Uexküll: “The Merkzeit, for 
Uexküll, is not a fact of consciousness, but a component of the physical structure, 
which is manifest in the behaviour of the animal” (Nature, p.173). 
xi Obviously we are (that is my-self here and now) somewhat cynically placed 
before this title of self-less-ness. Self-other. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
xii This latter apocalyptic hyperbole is, of course deplored (and adored by those 
who manage to simultaneously or implosively celebrate-deplore) in the works of 
Baudrillard and Virilio. Loss, implosion, gone and biblically profound these 
writings intone in the tone of street occupying sandwich board walkers who we in 
ignorance walk by and make room for. There is a nascent eroticism within these 
intonations that captivate in a similar way to McLuhan in the 60s/70s where 
media “theory” takes an emotive turn and becomes sexy within the very spaces 
that it trains its own optics on. The irony is not lost upon either party and a 
strange beelike dance of the hunter and the hunted ensues where each does not 
quite know which role the other is playing, as their roles (as both also notice) 
have imploded. 
xiii This before then should be heard in two senses, just as in Derrida’s ‘Before the 
Law’.  We would perhaps wish to see ourselves as responsible ‘before’ these 
technologies and before these technologies came along (either to add or take 
away; deposit or de-position), but also as responsible before reaction and before 
what is mechanical and prosthetic. The before then is not temporal or spatial (as 
one appears before some-time or some-space, e.g. ‘The Law’, in all our 
responsibility) but an inmixing of both and neither. Once we are before; once we 
were before; once we’re here before; once we’re there before: responsible or 
reactive; self-ful or self-less? The purpose of this paper then is not to mediate 
between these positions in favour of a new law, but of problematising any 
responsibility before such prostheses. The prosthesis, in being an already-
electrical, might not be so promised or threatened and might not be so whole. 
xiv We will ask, as can be imagined, what in fact a cyborg is and how one can use 
the somewhat questionable barrier the skin as the figural border of use of 
technology from technology becoming a newly integrated organ. Technological 
resources have been used ‘since the beginning’ as means of communication or 
expansion of the present horizon (the French archaeologist Andre Leroi-Gourhan 
pointed out some time ago the primal-originary nature of the hominid’s integral 
relation to technology –via the hand’s very shape- that questions any idea of an 
early innocence prior to a technological encroachment). Subcutaneous invasions 
and upgrades to the human skeleton partake in fact of a romantic image of a 
whole-being whose whole comes later to be invaded. Leroi-Gourhan points out 
that this invasion is hardly late coming but was always already underway. 
xv John Perry Barlow is a retired cattle rancher who takes much of the imigary of 
the wild west or the individualistic east coast Thoreueanism and transposes it 
across to the free space of cyberspace…. 
xvi  
xvii Embalmed|Unembalmed: Problems of the Lived Event in Media Studies 2.0’ 
xviii Similarly we would argue against (as would Derrida) any McLuhan-esque 
notion of a internetworked global village where everybody is brought together 
upon some de-territorialised ground. The realization of such a groundless ground 
pre-supposes a teleological concept of communication that would re-establish the 
connections (at last) that writing some time ago put asunder and divorced us 
from. Prior to this the oral-based community of village life allowed for an 
immediacy that writing later would place its deferring/differing delay circuits into 
and between. The story of such mediations has apparently here been also the 
story also of a simultaneous dispersion but re-gathering. At the end of the 
dispersed journey a secondary-writing (the poison) would also provide a 
secondary-orality (the cure) that will bring us back together through the very 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
means that originally separated us off from the immediacy of a unified social 
body. In a book titled ‘Digital McLuhan’ Levinson sees a vindication of McLuhan’s 
global village that sadly McLuhan himself (as ‘Digital Moses’ to this idea) did 
himself not get to experience or reside upon. The Internet brings us together 
upon an expansive land that at longlast is no longer divided or celled-up. 
xix My uneasy inverted commas, but not in a moral sense. Again the distinction 
(as in Heidegger’s between organic organ and secondary equipment) is pre-
supposed within the act that would see a future replacement of the entirety of the 
organs by new permanent technological (and thus not liable to decrepitude) 
organs. Is the distinction that Heidegger is eager to make between organs and 
equipment, not also presupposed in Kurzweill’s innocent idea of downloadings 
and replacements? It is true, to be sure, that Heidegger and Kurzweill come from 
two radically differing traditions (with the latter operating, in what Heidegger 
would see as Cartesian inspired technologically enframed world-picture), but both 
see something of the pre-prosthetic (paradoxical, to investigate further?) in the 
saveablity, presence or substantiality of something inside (and it could easily be 
argued that Kurzweill clings onto this in a much stronger fashion than does 
Heidegger who has a rather more ambivalent relationship between technicity and 
a soul-substance opposite). Kurzweill celebrates the machine and the picture but 
cannot let go of the idea of the self that such a machinery should store or 
animatedly archive. 
xx Although Fukuyama wrote about the end of history, he has questions about 
extending life into some near infinite. See ‘Out Posthuman Future’ 
xxi ‘The Singularity is Near’ and ‘The Age of Spiritual Machines’ are both very 
quantitatively-inclined books. Moore’s Law (of exponential computer speed 
increases) assure us of a time that is close on the horizon. Similarly Kevin 
Warwick tells the BBC website of the soon to occur takeover of the world by 
computer intelligence (which, as children watching for the monstrous, we should 
be watchful over) and how very close this is. Sarcastic as this note is toward such 
a conception, neither of these futurologists seem to need to consult any 
“authorities” within the departments of philosophy of mind. Kurzweill is aware of 
one such cynical philosopher (the militant Heideggerian scholar Dreyfus and his 
books about “What Computers Cannot Do” and “What Computers (Still) Cannot 
Do” which point out how the most seemingly basic of human comportments, 
based upon tacit, quite ‘fuzzy’ knowledge, cannot be downloaded into a Minskian 
robots, etc.) he calls a sort of spoil-sport. No counter-argument is needed, only a 
pointing out of speed increases and the continued embeddedness of the computer 
within our lives. This ‘within’ however should be conceptualized in very careful 
and variegated ways. 
xxii Dvorksy obviously coins this term in the early 21st century to show the 
technological culmination or supplementation of something altogether more 
occultist. The term that Dvorsky uses (techlepathy) plays on a term which itself 
was coined within an age of technological transformation. Addressing his 
colleagues of the London ‘Society for Psychical Research’ (an institution which he 
cofounded) Frederic Myers stated “we venture to introduce the words Telesthesia 
and Telepathy to cover all the cases of impression received at a distance without 
the normal operation of the recognised sense organs”. Myers introduced this term 
(just as Dvorsky does later, in a more neologistic-parasitical fashion) to replace 
‘thought-transference’ to precisely add the transfer of something ‘aesthetic’ or the 
receiving of impressions at a distance, while also partaking of the explosion of 
various tele-media (as Royle points out) that were promising tele-communication 
at the time. While the transfer of thought-at-a-distance offers the opportunity of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
something akin to the sharing of a purity of meaning, telepathy takes us closer to 
‘the’ site occupied by whatever impresses the notional sender in the first place. 
This impression is, as we will see below in Dvorsky’s own usage, something that 
would take us more proximate to the meaning-to-say that would first fire-off the 
meaning and the thoughts (which are secondary to the primacy of the 
impression). Here again then we find sympathy or empathy instead of a mere 
understanding of the other (albeit at some distance) and thus something much 
more hyperbolic than the transfer of a mere thought. 
xxiii This is dressed-up within the rhetorical garb of the futurist visionary who, as is 
so often the case, is someone who picks up on the invention of something that, 
innovative in itself, will have further revolutionary unforeseen “uses”. While this 
ontic innovation becomes tomorrow’s (Silicon Valley) fish and (silicon) chip 
wrapping, Dvorsky sees a revolutionary ontological way of unwrapping the self 
and opening this self to technological openness in all senses…  
xxiv It is this proximal spatial closer that so captivates Dvorsky’s attention within 
this local ontical invention. It resonates with something he has been thinking for 
a long time. For here he sees the intending-to-say as a site and a place that can 
by siphoned-off and directed to technologies that, as we will see, allow for two 
parties to be brought closer (and this closer is not simply some quantitative 
increase in proximity but a veritable qualitative transformation) to the spirit that 
desires union. Here we are obviously thinking of Derrida’s early study of Husserl 
in ‘Speech and Phenomena’ (some translate the title as ‘Voice and Phenomena’) 
where Derrida discusses Husserl’s attempts to divide a supposedly internal 
‘expressive’ sign from an external and public ‘indicative’ sign. The expressive sign 
however cannot clear itself of its indicative other and Husserl’s exploration of the 
intimacy of the self find itself surrounded on all sides by what is outside. It is this 
hidden-hauntedness, as with mis-appropriations from many other deconstructive 
readings, which Derrida will use more openly himself as differance.  Here Dvorsky 
presupposes the presence of the intimate (just as we will see that our main case 
study Warwick does also) that we would be able to share with our significant 
other outside of our poorly expressive indicative signage. Once we can siphon the 
site of the meaning-to-say, our loved one will come to see exactly what we mean. 
Derrida (or rather Husserl in his twists) points out however that here there is no 
pure thought (signified outside of signifiers) to purely “thought-transfer”. 
xxv Again we would refer to this desire to isolate some purity of signal that, just as 
with the complexities of moving robots along xyz coordinates involving 
“obstacles”, would allow access to some expressive ‘desire-point’ as a journey 
that is not only problematic at the notional point of arrival (communication with 
the interiority of the commicatee) but at the very point of departure itself (the 
commicator being able to be within their own proximity). 
xxvi As well as with Aristotle, entelechy was used as a term in the biological 
sciences and was introduced in the by the German 19th/20th century biologist 
Hans Driesch. Having similar qualms to Uexkull a few years later with his umwelt 
researches, Dreisch did not agree with the mechanistic externalist Darwinian 
views of the organism that were currently coming to dominate the biological 
sciences. He pointed to the entelechial motion of the organism towards its goal, 
etc. He also, interestingly, happened to believe in a telepathy. We will try to draw 
together some of these strings later in our argument. 
xxvii It is quite funny when he reaches the point where he visualizes the location of 
the new upstream interface, that although there is a location for the existing 
prosthesis developed by NASA that the newer more deeper-burrowing apparatus 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
is not really explained very well. He simply says, this simple next-step will involve 
the delivery of “a fancy neural data conversion device”. Such a simple device 
really is for others to worry about, for there will be really nothing to it. 
xxviii Because obviously this wish to erase the voco from the apparatus will not 
displace (in any Derridean general writing) the phonocentric but will, on the 
contrary, solidify its rule, its supposed archy. For the meaning-to-say is all the 
more deemed to be a location or coordinate, whose provenance and domain will 
be proven and expanded, on this view, on a higher, grander scale. 
xxix For in cutting out this deferred externalization that is the vocal apparatus, and 
placing an electric-prosthetic closer (if not at the very location) of the meaning-
to-say, we find something analogous in its desire to Husserl’s expressive as 
opposed to indicative sign that we discussed a few footnotes ago. 
xxx For as we will see, speech at present provides too much colloquy, and 
ultimately telepathy should furnish a sort of join-soliloquy.  
xxxi I say ‘practical’ for, as with Kurzweill, the creation of such practical ground-
floor prostheses is embedded within a larger more globalizing project that far 
outstrips the reach of these prostheses and lands us within territories that are. In 
his autobiography (or should we say auto-cyoborg-ography) ‘I, Cyborg’ Warwick 
talks of a time where our children’s children will “look back with wonder at how 
their ancestors could have been so primitive as to communicate by means of 
silly little noises called speech”. When one examines what Warwick 
understands by speech, we find however something quite linguistically primitive 
and that he is working within a model of communication which does not seem to 
feel the need to visit any theoretical debates on communication. Indeeed while 
the bibliography within this book has some interesting entries (Dreyfus, Haraway, 
Hayles, Fukuyama, Penrose), none of these are referred to within the main body. 
In a similar fashion Kurzweill (who Warwick received a supportive email from 
when some critics were wondering about his sales-patter when playing with his 
embedded prostheses), sees philosophers of mind, language, technics, etc. as 
just so many spoil-sports. Minsky had a similar approach at MIT in the 70’s but 
then was forced to reevaluate his use of Cartesian coordinates as quantitative 
data within the buildings of robotics. Philosophers of embodiment had been 
saying for some time that getting around was not merely a case of following 
some xyz mapping agenda but is based more around tacit knowledge and 
complex background processes. Although fuzzy-logics have begun to broach this 
post-quantitative approach, still notions of clean ‘information’ tend to override 
any possibly opposing ‘logic’. Indeed Warwick is very excited by error-diminution 
and seems somewhat to be caught in the wonderments of the infinitely plastic 
50s in his model of sci-fi futurity. The future is simply about ‘less errors’. 
xxxii And are these differences of buildings so different. We are not so much 
talking about the now-famous stretching of work into the home and the breaking 
of the border that upsets the work and homelife balance as a… 
xxxiii He makes references to film, both in semiotic terms in the external design of 
the prostheses (“Borg Collective” Art Nouveau curves) and in also pointing out 
that his own inventions have proved influential within certain filmic 
representations (James Bond subcutaneous chip is embedded in exactly the same 
place, a place unnecessary in itself as a subcutaneous location, as his own). He is 
very much tied then to his technology as a user-inventor of the old C19 shed-
based/sideshow tradition. And also gains, of course, a certain ethical prestige, 
through not putting someone else through what he himself would also not go 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
through. This provides a very overdeterined nexus of presences, just as he 
presents his inventions and his reinvented self. xxxiv	   Although it is not available to me, a titillatingly titled 2001 documentary 
called ‘Digital Sex’ has Warwick talking about being able to experience his wife’s 
pleasure and vice versa. While electrical implants are spoken about in the 
quotation below in terms of a direct brain-to-brain communication, this 
documentary takes a much more chemical approach where the presence of 
secretions of sexual hormones are passed along to the other and vice versa. The 
idea here is to complete a sexual-circuitry where again, as we will point out 
below, intercourse would itself presumably become its own absence. 
xxxv Or ‘Singularity’ to use Kurzweill’s “master” term. 
xxxvi Touch is, of course, a metaphor that carries a lot of gravity or weight. As 
Derrida has pointed out (in ‘On Touching: Jean-Luc Nancy) ‘touch’ often figures 
as the teleology of communication and acts therein as a sort of economic 
guarantor or gold-standard. “…I could almost touch it” can be attached to so 
many other apparatuses that it acts as a sort of master-prosthesis. This highly 
geo-metric figure (Berkeley himself saw sight as a becoming-touch sense and 
that the tactile quality of locating something is that something’s guarantee of 
what exactly it is. Add to later (imp. note for immediation idea) 
xxxvii Intercourse: “speech” in the sense of Dvorsky, “sex” in the sense of Warwick. 
xxxviii [The Intercourse of] Touch is here not listed as it is the supervisory 
authority-sense (as in footnote..) that serves these other two (speech and sex). 
As the master-sense it would have these other two be able to reach-inside-the-
other and find something singular that it can touch. Such is the whole that such 
touching presupposes and upon which the subject (as responsible agent) is pre-
supposed, etc. (clean-up note, develop?) 
xxxix This is the model of writing that McLuhanesque models of mediation work 
within. Something more than simply a village, and something better than a 
reintegrated higher-scale talk? 
xl As somebody pointed out to me in conversation at the Cardiff Zoontotechnics 
conference where I delivered this paper, the figure of technological/telepathy has 
changed somewhat since the  sc-fi images of 1950s/60s, from information 
transferral to something now much more ispeic and intimate and which this paper 
has been attempting to address  in a related sense. Perhaps this mutation within 
the figurology of the tele-pathology (from a wish for a teleological structure of 
pure information to a desire for pure orgasmic immanent-interiority) fits or locks 
in well with a recent turn to the affective and the emotive, which has been 
mapped by many scholars recently (and which docusoaps in television reflect on 
a more quotidian or everyday lived-level.  
xli This was Jakob Von Uexküll’s term that sought to tackle the predomininant 
Darwinian and anatomically centered theories that sought merely to take apart 
the physics of the particular creature or organism. Uexkull saw the more 
important goal as understanding how these physical apparatuses all glue together 
to form into an (gestalt-like) umwelt for the particular creature composed of 
these parts (sensory receptors, motor effectors, etc.). Neither outside nor inside, 
the umwelt enables the outside to appear as such. In a sort of pre-Derridean “Il 
n'y a pas de hors-texte” (often translated as “nothing outside the text”, but 
better to say “there is no outside-text”), Uexküll pointed out that we should not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
look at the subject or its objects as merely entities with properties but as 
meaningful totalities each with its own containing bubble. In his famous essay ‘A 
Stroll Through the Worlds of Animals and Men’ he presents pictorial figures that 
show his drawing-room from the ‘internal’ perspective of both a human and a 
dog, showing the different ‘views’ of these same objects that each subject has 
depending on the requirements of each of the species of which they are a 
member. While the dog, caught within the total “institution” of its species, sees  
only a mechanical reflection of its rather entrapped species-being, the human is 
faced with an infinitely plastic universe. An example of this plasticity of being: 
any recent western visitor to Uexküll’s drawing room would see something 
altogether different to what one of Uexküll’s contemporaries would have seen. 
Such would be the richness of differing historico-cultural possibilities and 
uncertainties available to the human ‘umwelt’. Human response versus animal 
reaction. Influential on Heidegger, he himself creates a huge unbridgeable gap 
between animals and men that betrays a certain religious gathering, even in the 
midst of a scientific endeavor: “animals” in all their variety and variegatedness 
are huddled together on one side and are poor, while “men” all stand upright on 
the other side and are rich and open in their gathering of the world. 
xlii As I am programmed to do. 
xliii (and of the remoteness of site or of our situatedness). Here we could add to 
the totality of this gaze a panop-tech-clair-voyance?. 
xliv This inevitably adds a sense input, which forms a sort of meta-sense input that 
would closely metaphorically mimic at least one of the accepted other five. A 
sixth sense is thus called upon which is a sense nonetheless. This supplement of 
a sixth sense however adds a dimension lacking in the poorer more accepted 
siblings. A telesthetic apparatus is thus born. A newer extra-sensory third-eye 
arises then that would see further but also see altogether differently; it 
penetrates deeper just as it penetrates otherwise. This third-eye would operate 
right from the captain’s inner eye without the need for the aspects of the physical 
vessel that the captain would rely upon: the captain here is in no need of the ship 
that he nevertheless is steering. The res cogitans sees purely outside of the 
embodied sensorium of the res extensa that nevertheless forms the contours of 
the very metaphoric interests that it needs as justification. Speaking of 
metaphorical extension, Hitschmann likens the myth of telepathy to “a psychic 
prosthesis, a stretched-out arm, which reaches out mystically toward that which 
is far off and cannot be approached in actuality by physical means” (p.126). Once 
the subject is subjected to psychoanalytic translation, the tele-language of 
telepathy gets reconverted into familial transactions displaced by the psyche.  
xlv Perhaps most strange is a certain acceptance of the possibility of telepathy by 
the physicist Einstein. He wrote a short forward for a book on telepathy by the 
American social critic Upton Sinclair called ‘Mental Radio’. The book, again 
suggesting the centrality of telepathy to the family circle, surrounding tests on his 
depressed second wife, reports on tests of her ability to read certain signifiers 
that she herself did not have sensorial access to through her five accepted 
senses. We will see in the footnote below the metaphoric importance of 
secondary prosthetic apparatuses for likening these telepathic internal 
apparatuses. 
xlvi Freud stated that: “What we call ‘telepathy’ is, as you know, the alleged fact 
that an event which occurs at a particular time comes at about the same moment 
to the consciousness of someone distant in space, without the paths of 
communication that are familiar to us coming into question. It is implicitly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
supposed that this event concerns a person in whom the other one (the receiver 
of intelligence) has a strong emotional interest. For instance, Person A may 
be the victim of an accident or may die, and Person B, someone nearly attached 
to him –his mother or daughter or fiancée- learns the fact at about the same time 
through a visual or auditory perception. In this latter case, then, it is as if she 
had been informed by telephone, though such was not the case:” Leaning 
against a comparison with a secondary prosthesis, Freud points to a primary 
prosthesis that in bypassing the primary communicative apparatuses, ends up 
taking on the qualities of what is counted as a graft. Again the presence of a prior 
“connection” allows for this primary-prosthesis to be something much less 
invasive or secondary than a graft or techno-graft. 
xlvii some temporarily missing or misplaced postcards that finally made it to their 
recipient. Playing on Lacan’s message that a letter always reaches its destination, 
it seems that these postcards did not make it through to their recipient in time for 
being published in “Postcard: From Plato to Freud and Beyond”. These postcards 
speak of the character’s love for his lover… 
xlviii Although Derrida points out that Freud did not actually deliver these 
introductory lectures, but they make it into a transcription as delivered in this 
lively, public-forum way. 
xlix Somnambulism is not of actuality or entelechy. Hegel sees actuality as an 
aggregate of interests that compose the individual who only comes together as 
“his genius” once out of an auto-matistic somnambulist stage (which would 
include base-clairvoyance (see Philosophy of Spirit, S.406) 
l Indeed it would be hard to find a reference to any act of telepathy that did not 
serve to solidify a family relation and the family relation itself, as we will see, is 
what commun-icates itself to us via clair-voyance and this telesthetic telepathy. 
In an article titled ‘Telepathy and Psychoanalysis’ Edward Hitschmann, a close 
colleague of Freud’s, tells the story of the poet Max Dauthendey who had 
telepathic intimations of his father’s death and later received a tele-gram 
recording his father’s death as simultaneous with the thought he had earlier had. 
Hitschmann comes to explain this according to certain historical troubles within 
the trouble bubble of the family circle. But in a manner very similar to Freud (and 
Hegel) we find an ambivalence to telepathy that is something more than a middle 
ground, but where the family owns a sort of centralised position. Across a number 
of articles we find a vibrating indecision that at one time rejects and at another is 
more accepting. This splinter under the skin of the body of psychoanalysis finds 
within the family a very troubling and rather uncanny home that a more 
program-performative prosthetelepathy will come to inhabit in its turn, as we will 
see. 
li For want of interpreting after the fashion of Wallace, environment here seems to 
refer, not so much to a physicality of environment, but to an environment that 
seems a little like Uexkull’s umwelt bubble…. 
lii For this is not an invention, so much as an invention that, as we saw, pre-
invents something natural and inherent. An invention is something, by definition, 
that comes out of nowhere (and we are thinking along the lines here of Derrida’s 
dual concepts of l’avenir/futur and of the invention/discovery duality that he 
excavates in his presentation/essay ‘Of the Aforementioned Human Genome 
Project’. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
liii Warwick’s previous incarnation was as a British Telecom engineer, so telephony 
is something close to his heard, and no doubt something that haunted him in his 
youth, as he looked forward to inventions he is currently inventing. The end of 
the age of invention, he will show is not over with.  
liv A theoretically exciting book titled ‘The Telephone Book’ by Avital Ronnell 
considers these envoi issues with telephonic communication which is very much 
in the spirit of Derrida’s (non-moralistic) questions concerning tele-technologies. 
Far from de-distancing the possibility of crossed-wires these technologies 
hauntologically allude and denude the “certainty” of paths of communication all 
the more. Similarly in the film ghostdance Derrida does not allow the post-feudal 
age of information technology to prevent the summoning of the ghostly or of the 
monstrous. 
lv For we would like to play with a thought  experiment where a third party might 
hack (or be invited) into a couple’s tech-clair-voyant circuitry. Just as the 
pornographic industries are to be found prowling close-by in greeting the births of 
almost all media opportunities so, no doubt, we can visualize a newer way of 
experiencing porn where we plug, as somewhat ‘interactive’ audiences, into a 
couple’s sexual activity. In a scene reminiscent of Spielberg’s ‘Minority Report’ we 
might find certain dirty old men plugging into (via a Warwickian embedded chip 
with credit-card payment options attached) certain apparatuses that interface 
with the interior of certain tele-distinguished bodies. In terms of the, now remote, 
possibility of a partner circumventing the watchful panoptic gaze of the ‘blood-
friend’ partner, one could foresee a ploy where a cheating spouse could convince 
their official blood-friend that they found the other to be pleasuring them through 
the devious syncing up a time where the person they really wanted to make love 
with was broadcasting their pleasure at the exact same time coordinate. What is 
to stop the official blood-friend from believing that it is them that is ‘supplying’ 
the transference of this signal-communication, rather than the one their partner 
would rather be with. “Were you thinking of someone else?”, might still then be a 
possibility in terms of a hacking-to-the-path-of-the-proper. Again, shades of the 
somewhat circuitous slidings from the gaze of the panopticon which remind one 
of Minority Report in steeling somebody else’s eyes to slip the iris identity gaze of 
a truth/identity-seeking state apparatus. And further outside of the proper-home 
of the blood-friend tech-clair-voyancing, could we not, somewhat perversely 
perhaps, vacariously be-towards-someone-else’s-death by embedding a chip in 
certain suicidal bodies in something not altogether different to a taped or filmed 
suicide (this latter has been attempted on YouTube). Interesting as these 
apparatuses would no doubt be, such secondary or even primary identification (as 
in the cinema) is never so easily transposable, as do we ever truly identify with 
ourselves before we come to gaze? But there are further issues that take us into 
the vicinity of the (Austinian) performance of  “the promise” and of any other 
first-person performatives, that depend upon the notion of an isolable causally 
responsible agency enveloped or wrapped up within their own secure decision-
making apparatuses. Following again further through the territory of these two 
rather frivolous thought experiments on thought-transfer, will there be any future 
need for the “I do” of the marriage ceremony, or further of the sexual intercourse 
that performatively secures the bond within its very securing (thus in this latter 
case obviating the very thing which the apparatus was invented to augment)? “I 
do”, as Derrida points out in SEC, only accomplishes the intentional transposal of 
an “itself” by also simultaneously allowing itself to not accomplish itself. As soon 
as there is no need for the “I do”, because there is not now any uncertainty of 
intention that would need the “transmission” of an expressive-indicative “I do”, 
there is also no longer the thing itself. For how can the thing exist outside also of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
its possible integral failure. Such is the strange logic of the performative which 
Derrida uncovered within Austin’s impressive lecture course upon the (excitable) 
saying that does things. 
